In May and June of this year , coroner’s inquests were staged at the Old Bailey into the deaths that occurred during the so-called terrorist incident of June 3rd, 2017, at London Bridge and Borough Market. Naturally, because it constituted an effort to translate an official narrative into done-and-dusted history, the scope of the proceedings went well beyond merely providing satisfactory explanations (to the best of the inquest’s ability) for why some people died (victims and attackers both). Indeed, it even ventured, on at least one occasion known of, to shore up narrative against penetration by the shots of event-scepticism, and FBEL might have had something to do with that†.
This article will be the first of a number that scrutinise the inquest evidence with a view to evaluating the merit of observations made at the time of the incident here at FBEL; the observations feature in the pieces titled, London Terror optics: police frighten the innocent public (here), and Much more to London Bridge and Borough Market than meets the eye (here). As yet, the author has only read the transcript produced by the first few days of the inquest into the victims’ deaths – and some of that only partially – for the purpose of writing this introductory piece. Reading will be ongoing, of course, and any new break-down in coherence of narrative that arises because of the inquest evidence will be presented in further articles.
One of the obvious problems with the official narrative has always been that, for it to be considered sound, it required a belief that so much damage was possible by so few in so short a time. That there was an implausibly limited amount of time for the assailants to do everything attributed to them featured large in FBEL’s coverage – and here is a convenient juncture to make a note about that. An apparent incident in or near an establishment called Tito’s restaurant, located on London Bridge Street, was thought to have been a location where patrons were set upon by marauding knifemen. Actually, what happened might be explained as a reaction to the arrival of people wounded elsewhere who were seeking refuge: Tito’s would appear to be closer to the scene of the crime than previously thought. That being said, any explanation for why there was a scenario at Tito’s whereby patrons were told to get down on the floor, and were evacuated into Borough High Street will be being looked for in the inquest transcripts. Except for the raid by police on the Blue Eyed Maid (situated much further south along Borough High Street) – which again, would need to be officially explained – the spread of activity on the night in question appears to be limited to a smaller area than was thought at the time, thus at least allowing one to suppose that the tasks of the assailants were not, after all, impossible. On the other hand, there is what one might call narratively extraneous activity within that area (and just beyond it, in the case of the Blue Eyed Maid) that might not be related to the known assailants, and which could be evidence for involvement of additional persons for the purpose of committing as great an amount of terror in the short window of time that was available. Once again, explanation for all such goings-on will be being looked for in the inquest evidence.
At the time of the of the incident, it was assumed at FBEL that a short route was travelled by the assailants between the site of their disembarkation from a van, located at the south end of London Bridge, down to Stoney Street, where it appeared that all the injury by knifings had occurred. This was an incorrect assumption. Moreover, the initial understanding of the incident did not factor in what turned out to be a killing zone at an establishment called the Boro Bistro, which was located immediately in the vicinity of the assailants’ abandoned van. Five out of the eight people who died by knifing were killed in close proximity to the Boro Bistro. Another victim was killed as the assailants were leaving this place, so it could qualify as another count on the Boro Bistro killing zone tally. That would mean that apart from the two people who were supposedly killed when the van struck them on London Bridge, all the deaths occurred at and close to Boro Bistro.
This grouping was something that was entirely unappreciated by the author in 2017, and it can be put down to omission, or even misdirection, by corporate-media in its initial reporting (which was the reference material used to write the FBEL articles). Without a doubt, corporate-media made it appear as if all of the trouble happened along Stoney Street, and at one establishment on Rochester Walk. Rochester Walk, of course, would form a section of the short cut from London Bridge which the author assumed had to be the route of the assailants in order to allow for time constraints. Moreover, that the reporting seemed to suggest that the attack commenced at the Black & Blue restaurant also gave support to the “short route” notion. From there, it seemed as if the rampage continued southwards down Stoney Street until the assailants were confronted and stopped by an armed policing response outside the Wheatsheaf pub.
In fact, the inquest told of how the assailants disembarked from their transport – a van crashed into railings above the sub-street level Boro Bistro – and then descended steps down into the courtyard where that establishment was located, after which they ascended once again to Borough High Street to follow it, eventually to arrive at Stoney Street from the south, and not the north. Astonishingly, the official narrative then has the assailants travelling northwards up Stoney Street to the location of the Black & Blue, and then back south along the same road to the site of their demise. It is astonishing, because it means that, given that the “long way around” version of events means so much more time lost in travelling, the problem of there not being enough minutes for three men, moving together, to do everything attributed to them is maintained.
That being said, necessity very likely dictates. What is undoubtedly an awkward version of events is probably for the sake of sustaining a unified narrative in the face of a story that emanated from a witness who saw an attacker, at the southern approaches of Stoney Street in Borough High Street, who was dressed differently from the three known assailants – at least as they were captured in imagery at the time they were confronted by an armed response. More on this follows shortly.
If the failure on the author’s part to understand Boro Bistro as the foremost location of significance was indeed down to omission or misdirection by corporate-media, it is a situation that could indicate that there had been a deliberate attempt to hide something of incredible tactical significance. At this stage, so far, the author has counted twenty-four other stabbing victims of the attack; these are people besides the six fatal casualties who received knife wounds. These other casualties were accumulated all along the route travelled by the assailants. However, people only died in the Boro Bistro killing zone, and from the author’s preliminary reading, there appears to be a trend towards dying quickly. It suggests that the assailants at Boro Bistro had skill verging on professionalism with wielding a knife in order to slay.
In the FBEL articles written at the time of the incident, it was hinted that there might have been more than three attackers because of the all too obvious time constraints. The Boro Bistro killing zone is evidence to support this if it can be discerned that it was assaulted by a “death squad” separately to another detachment of men who, for the purpose of creating an impression of a more complete terror attack, were produced in a different area (Stoney Street) to indiscriminately flourish their weapons, without necessarily knowing how to, or wanting to create terminal wounding.
Of course, there is a lead for this trail of investigation to be found in that abovementioned story about a differently dressed attacker in Borough High Street. Indeed, it is perhaps highly significant that the inquest sought to rationalise this information by claiming that two of the three attackers took off jackets in Stoney Street, which led to “confusion later in the evening about the possibility of a further attacker in a red top”. It remains to be seen who exactly suffered from any miscomprehension on the night of the attack; the author’s bet is that there wasn’t any, and this episode at the inquest was actually meant as an exercise in official narrative damage limitation. It is not enough, however. Please note that at the time of the incident, FBEL recorded the devastating witness testimony that might otherwise have been so easily overlooked, whereby “one of the attackers was wearing a red tracksuit [suggesting red trousers too], with hoodie, and who must have been progressing down Borough High Street to the bottom [southern] end of Stoney Street”. It was surmised that “he was a fourth attacker because the other three were not wearing red.”
Unfortunately, rather than stymieing questioning minds, the introduction of the fact of undressing terrorists inevitably provides fertile ground for investigation, because it was said at the inquest that the removal of jackets “would… have made the suicide vests even more visible”. The reference is to comic-looking props worn by the attackers that should have looked less convincing the more they were revealed to an observer. In any case, if evidence cannot be found of witnesses noting such apparel on the attackers as they killed in Boro Bistro, it could constitute a significant gap in the data that would suggest that different personnel had indeed been active in two different areas.
Turning to a different issue, in the FBEL articles written at the time of the attack, it was suggested that police had played a crucial supplementary role in creating the terror, achieved by responding in a manner that would elicit panic, and exploiting the mood of a crowd that had knowledge of supposed terrorists in its midst. The inquest supplies more ground to the accusation of complicity, as it was revealed that police ignored their own protocol to put unarmed officers in a “hot zone” – which is a place that only armed response police can go so as to make it safe – in order to evacuate people from the area. This was characterised at FBEL as filling the streets with panicking people for the sake of promoting an impression of a broad brutal assault on a population centre. Moreover, the inquest revealed that the armed response units deployed to Borough Market continued to shoot at the three suspects after they had been downed by weapons fire, and even after at least one of them had been put in handcuffs.
As it turned out, the shooting caused a serious injury in a bystander whose story really needs a good deal of substance added to it, lest it begin to appear that he has been disappeared and what happened to him covered up. In other words, as his reading continues, the author will be interested to discover how much the inquest tells of Neil McLelland, with findings presented to the FBEL audience. Likewise, conformation will be sought of the police admission that 50 bullets had been discharged against the three suspects. If this astonishingly high figure is true, and given the author’s preliminary reading regarding the downing of the suspects and the swiftness of it, it possibly indicates two things: armed responders spent a lot of ammunition because they had been deliberately shooting at other things than the supposed assailants (e.g. further suspects or innocent bystanders), or they wanted to make a lot of noise in order to generate an impression of a battle ground so as to frighten corporate-media consumers who would, the next morning, digest a notion of an overstated threat along with their cornflakes. Crucially, a lot more people were injured during the Borough Market and London Bridge terror incident than those who received knife wounds. The author will be looking to see if any were caused by the discharge of a weapon.
Because their conduct had such a vital role to play in the execution of the incident, the intended article series will not be complete without a discussion regarding how the inquest deals with the effectiveness of the police. No doubt, there will be high praise, despite the fact the incident provided more proof that police are unfit for purpose. Moreover, the incident serves as reminder that a major contributing factor in police failure has been the recruitment of women into the ranks. Time and again, the accounts of the deaths of the victims involve police being quickly on the scene of the attack, but to concern themselves only with attending the injured. In some cases, they wasted their time trying to revive terminal cases for whom nothing further could be done – and while the assailants were still active. They did this instead of engaging the assailants, with only a few exceptions.
The whole point of having police, as far as the popular concept of “policing by consent” is concerned, is that a private citizen abdicates certain responsibility (which empowers the state) in return for the risk of crime being shouldered by specialist guardians. The police, then, should be an extension of the citizen so that the latter, rather than act in his own self-defence, can expect the former to get in harm’s way as a proxy. Quite evidently, this is not how things are. Indeed, policing by consent has always been mythology, as explained in the FBEL article, The police as militia, and the “policing by consent” deception.
Indeed, the recruitment of women into UK police forces is a glaring admission that the State does not understand there to be any such contract between it and the public whereby the latter will be kept safe. In relation to men, purely because of physical differences, women are ineffective in dealing with the sorts of crime against the law whereby citizenry would expect themselves or their property to be defended. Be that as it may, implementing Equality and Diversity means pretending that qualities do not exist which would make one person more suitable than another, and the police have all too obviously concocted protocols to negate the differences. Thus, at Borough Market, female constables featuring as glorified paramedics serve as reminder as to why it is that unarmed police are, by protocol, not allowed to be in the vicinity of active terrorists. Meanwhile, armed units then become vital as far as the police authorities would have the public believe, even when they are shooting at characters dressed in stage property unconvincingly fashioned to resemble explosive devices. Of course, the real enemy of armed police is the people, discontented by politicians, rabble-roused and suitably demonised – at least, this is how things are visualised as an outcome anticipated by Government. Even so, just as in the Christchurch incident earlier this year, the single most important lesson to be learnt from Borough Market is that the people must insist on being able, and having the means to defend themselves, and especially from those who the criminal State would set amongst them to try to kill them.
† If these pages, in these days of the Idiocracy, are either too hard to read, or too hard to stomach to retain a large audience, they might be some of the very few things that come between the sheep and the butcher because they constitute off-the-payroll (otherwise it just couldn’t happen) and serious (because a lot of the alternative media is a deliberate joke) documentation of history alternate to that which justifies and empowers the British ruling class – which prefers conditions whereby it can act with impunity. The “other history” represents watchfulness until there is an opportunity to prosecute and bring about downfall, and the potential for this, despite the impression one might have of their inevitable power, is evidently not lost on people who go to a lot of trouble to conceal their crimes. Be that as it may, the nature of Government of the Sheeple means that avoiding penalisation just becomes a waiting game: those who would be butchered cannot see the horns for the wool, and do not appreciate the arms at their disposal, and do not invest in them. While the compiler of “other history” runs out of money, or dies out not having been able to set up an apparatus that is robust enough to survive him, on the other side, nevertheless, the Government of the Sheeple has fleece enough, and perpetually so, to wrap itself in a luxurious blanket of insulating history.