As it turns out, the police intervention at Woolwich was so odd and full of anomaly that it is very hard to pretend that it was real. There is evidence that is stark and that can’t be ignored which shows that the police interchange with Adebowale and Adebolajo was pure theatre. There is too much of it. So, we must conclude that if the police intervention was theatre, then there wasn’t a crime that triggered it. Real crime triggers real police intervention. Real crime does not set off a play act involving the so-called criminals – real criminals would not play along, for a start. And a play act would explain why the physical evidence does not match the narrative of the attack – evidence that is not organically manufactured will not compliment the narrative. If evidence is not naturally littered upon the scene due to real events, but instead are placed according to someone’s imagination, then they won’t make sense when tested against what is expected in reality. Likewise, witness accounts will not make sense if the witnesses do not see real events, but are fooled by play acting. Some witnesses will of course lie outright, and others will ignore their own perception and compensate by adopting the official narrative. Who is to say that witness statements weren’t manufactured for them like we know the case was with Adebolajo – at least in one attempt that came to light?
Therefore in his section of the book we are going to examine the police shootout from the perspective of having concluded that it must be theatre – a hoax. The phase of the incident that we are going to study in this section can be described by parameters that start as Adebolajo terminates his rant by the Number 53 bus, and extends to just after the police have engaged with the two Michaels and before the paramedics and other emergency services turn up on the scene.
The evidence we are going to consider is principally in four pieces of video footage; the Mirror Footage, the Council Footage, the Sun Arrest Footage, and the Camera Phone Footage. On top of all this, of course, is more witness testimony. This time we consider the claims by two of the arresting officers – the third was not heard, apparently. None of the officers were mentioned by name, but by operation codes. E42 and E48 were male police officers, and D49 was a female one – she was the driver of the car that brought all these officers to the scene. E42 was in the front passenger seat. E48 was the navigator, and surprisingly, in the rear. D49 had a witness testimony read out in court. E48 was in court personally to give evidence – except he needn’t have really bothered because he was allowed to testify anonymously and from behind a screen. Although the judge was allowed to see his credentials (E48 handed his warrant card to him) this hardly matters. The judge wouldn’t have studied the footage to ensure that any picture ID corresponded with the faces in it. By not seeing E48, the defence team did not have that opportunity – anyone could have testified. In truth, there is no way to be sure that the written statements given by police were from the same people who attended the incident, but the screen really denied an opportunity to marry the account with the protagonist.
To demonstrate that the police engagement with the two Michaels was theatre we can point to an overall unreality of police behaviour, and we can point to anomalies that happen during the incident. We can look at the footage to find physical anomalies that wouldn’t happen in something that was organic. As for judging about process anomalies, we can’t do this. We can’t judge individual acts by the police during the engagement and whether they were according to or against policy or a rule. The author does not know the rules, and expects any he may find to be purely for public consumption; i.e. different to ones that the Metropolitan Police may actually employ. Even if we suspect police to have done something in any particular process that was a variation to established practise (we only have our common sense to go on there) we can’t tell if they were a result of incompetence or deliberately created anomalies. Moreover, we can’t ask question about procedure that seems to defy our common sense because the British Establishment has long since renounced possession of that quality.
We can say, however, that the Metropolitan Police has a shoot-to-kill policy. This is both officially stated, and appears to be evidenced empirically. When Jean Charles de Menezes was murdered by police in 2005, it came out that Police had nurtured an ideology regarding the confronting of terrorists which manifested in the principle of shooting them dead without warning. Operation Kratos was the umbrella name for these rules of engagement. According to the Wikipedia entry, the term is no longer in use by the Metropolitan Police, but the tactics survived. Indeed, the head of the Metropolitan Police said at the time that “shoot to kill in order to protect would continue” and warned that more innocent people could be shot dead in the name of fighting terror.
After Mark Duggan was killed by police in 2011 it emerged that a sinisterly named tactic of “hard stop” had not been reviewed in 2005 as it should have been (the Independent Police Complaints Commission deemed it too high risk). In a later BBC Panorama programme “officers from the unit that killed Mr Duggan… [said] they would kill again if they thought their colleagues were about to die”.
In September of 2014, a man was shot dead by police in Islington after he had held a woman hostage in her flat with a knife. It probably sounds as though the crime justifies the response, but on closer examination, it becomes doubtful. It became apparent that the man was known to the woman, so what had developed was obviously a rather ugly domestic argument. When police first arrived at the scene the man was in the process of making a raucous and aggressive exhibition – neighbours reported that they thought he must have been drunk. A police negotiator arrived, but any talks died out. Then, at about 1am – a good two hours after the incident had began, the police stormed the flat with stun grenades and proceeded to assault the man with weapons fire – 5 shots sounded apparently – so that he would die en route to the hospital 20 minutes later. The information that police passed to corporate-media involved the culprit having a knife and holding it to the woman’s throat, and this is what was sensationally reported on sites such as the MailOnline. The supposition that consumers of this story would then make is that the police rescued the woman from the point of a blade. We have no reason to automatically believe this to be true, but we can say that it would be the sort of thing, if true, that would go some way to justifying the police murdering a man.
And in actual fact, there is a detail that was reported in the MailOnline that suggests that it possibly wasn’t a completely accurate portrayal of events. It turned out that the police moved to deal with the situation “after a period of relative quiet”. This must be interpreted to mean that the police allowed a lull to occur – waited until the man was off his guard – and then took him out. This doesn’t sound like the police dealing with the situation when the man was in the height of his passion and the woman was most at risk. It sounds like the police taking an opportune moment to shoot a man instead of having to arrest him by hand and risk their own safety.
The fact of the matter is, this approach would totally reflect the reality of the culture that is currently ubiquitous in government – that personnel put themselves at no risk. Some people call it Health and Safety “gone mad” – in actual fact it’s a way of having government treat the public without applying common sense, or allowing the public to act upon their own; it’s a component of tyranny. These are the principles behind UK police forces’ shoot to kill policies – terror is just a pretext for it.
Returning to the matter in hand, then, we can be sure that the police at Woolwich, if it had been a real engagement, would ideally liked to have dealt with the two Michaels at distance. Similarly, they would have engaged them when it involved the least most risk to personnel. However, what happened in Woolwich didn’t represent the no-risk culture: the police officers most definitely and most uncharacteristically placed themselves in harm’s way. This in itself is big indicator that the engagement was not real.