The shelling of northern Syria by Turkish forces in October was presented by the Turkish government, by NATO, by UK politicians, and by UK corporate-media as retaliation for Syrian aggression. However, that such shelling continued on and off for the entire duration of the month spoke instead of full participation by Turkish forces arraigned along the border in some of the most critical battles of the war. Not many corporate observers, if any at all, extrapolated this scenario from the data – a scenario which involved Syrian forces spoiling a NATO plan for buffer-zones by dint of being close to the Turkish border and engaged in hostilities. From this perspective, events since then suggest that Turkey’s border-war against Syria has become redundant, been lost – or Turkey doesn’t have the stomach for it; the Syrian National Council, the so-called rebel leadership, is quintessentially and inextricably linked with Turkey, and that it is now being dumped by the US Government could also be construed as a reflection on how Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his country are possibly surplus to requirements in terms of a new strategy for Syrian destabilisation.
Some people say that the infamous mortar attack that set off Turkish “retaliation” and that struck Akcakale to kill 5 Turkish civilians on 3rd October was not of Syrian origin. Instead, they say, it was a false flag attack that provided the Turkish parliament with the justification for passing a bill to enable unilateral action by their armed forces inside Syria. On hindsight, there is definitely a whiff of ultra-convenience about the timing of the incident. Moreover, the fact that the shelling of Syria from Turkish positions may have happened uninterruptedly all through October suggests that the Turkish used the Akcakale incident as a pretext to take part in an unreported drawn-out defence, coordinated with NATO’s jihadist mercenary forces, of areas on the Turkish border - at least, for certain, in the province of Idleb – against Syrian attack.
There is a coincidence of two reports from the end of October that points to strategic Turkish involvement. On 29th October, Yahoo News logged a report of an attack from Turkey’s state-run news agency which said that Turkish artillery had responded to a stray shell fired from Syria. The border village of Besaslan, where the ordnance fell, is immediately adjacent to the Syrian town of “Haram”, where, as Yahoo News acknowledged, Syrian regime forces were located and doing battle with “rebels”. On 31st October, SyrianFreePress reported that Syrian forces had finally broken a siege of Harem, and in an associated piece about conditions in the town while the foreign mercenaries had been besieging it, a witness account given to an Arabic radio interviewer and transcribed into English made a tiny mention of how the Turks had been directly involved:
Harem is now completely isolated and without the minimum necessary for survival, under intense rain of artillery fire by the Turkish army.
Here Turkey is accused of a direct active role in the fighting, something that would naturally remain unreported in UK corporate-media so as not to frighten the oblivious British with the idea of a regional war (which, with Turkey bombing the PKK in Iraq, PKK attacks in Turkey, and spillover into Lebanon, is pretty much already here). The shape and form of Turkey’s involvment makes sense if there is any truth to the story about Vladimir Putin’s blunt comment to Erdogan which a Lebanese newspaper claims to have obtained knowledge of: “A single Turkish soldier on the soil of Syria would be equal to its entrance in Moscow”[sic]. While there seems to be no way of verifying that any such words were ever spoken, it is credible that Russia would not like to see Turkish willingness to provide some kind of direct intervention on its borders manifest as troop deployment. On the other hand, Turkey may have considered that it could get away with covering artillery fire for its allied ground force, the Free “Syrian” Army (hosted and armed by the Turks, of course). The stakes would be so high that Turkey could not afford not to get involved; these on the Turkish border were the areas that were going to form buffer zones over which NATO aircraft were going to patrol. As such, they would be an important objective for the Syrian armed forces to capture, and for NATO’s proxy terrorist army to hold.
Unfortunately for NATO, the signs are that the terrorists are not in a position to stop what seems to be a country-wide and relentless Syrian mopping-up operation. The official corporate-media reportage talks of Syrian forces being squeezed, but the corporate-media stopped being reliable a long time ago. So, while the Al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra was making headlines with suicide and car bombs this Sunday (with the likes of the Telegraph’s Robert Spencer – whose colleagues have already criminally solicited support for Islamist terror in their writing – offering nothing condemnatory about “rebel” forces consisting of terrorists “[with] determination and discipline… in some cases acquired from experience in Afghanistan and Iraq”), buried in the reportage was news that an air raid in the Harem area had killed at least 20 rebels with a rebel commander having been seriously wounded.
The ultimate clue of Turkish and NATO failure, however, is how the US Government is currently attempting to “reshape” the leadership of the so-called rebels. In a statement last week, Hilary Clinton described the SNC as “no longer [to] be viewed as the visible leader of the opposition.” The BBC, in its reportage, asked the question, “will US succeed in reshaping opposition?”, which is an incredible choice of words that shows how knowledge of direct US control of the fighting in Syria manifests itself in the open consciousness of those who are supposed to be disguising it.
Many observers are saying that the desperate US public tinkering is due to how it is no longer possible to hide the fact that the Syrian “rebels” are radicalised and increasingly sectarian and Islamist, including large numbers of Al Qaeda-linked foreign fighters who have poured into the country (or, it should be said, been hired by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UK, US and France to go there) from Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Chechnya and elsewhere. It is thought that the sidelining of the SNC is an attempt to re-launch the deadly initiative of a mercenary expeditionary force under a new, less corrosive name and identity, but there are other command and control considerations implied in the shake up.
The SNC are now linked irreversibly with Turkey; if the US Government is rejecting the SNC, then doesn’t it follow that it is also sidelining Erdogan’s government? Such a development would explain Erdogan’s recent turnaround in attitude as to what Turkey could do in Syria. As mentioned above, not so long ago, the Turkish parliament had given itself the right to act unitarily in Syria, although there was a caveat; Ankara made clear it would only mount any major operation on Syrian soil with international support.
Now Erdogan is reported to hold the following position: “if the UN hasn’t made… [a] decision [about no-fly zones], we [the Turkish Government] have no authority, no right to declare such a zone in northern Syria”. The difference between the new and old positions is quite clear; Turkey, would have led, but now they can only follow. The alteration in attitude suggests that Turkey has lost support, and some observers think that Erdogan is making an effort to reconcile himself to Iran and Russia. The Washington Post talks about Erdogan’s isolation, not only from one-time allies, but from his dissenting electorate (another important factor).
The buffer zone plan, at least as it has been envisaged, therefore, seems to have been set aside; that Erdogan’s comments came at the end of October might point to the moment when the decision to set it aside was made. This moment roughly coincides with another moment of pointed Syrian success in Harem; it is unlikely that these things are not unrelated.
If the no-fly zones have been deemed unwinnable, so-called “administrative” zones of control are objectives that are associated with the creation of a new, acceptable, revamped Syrian opposition. Conjecture suggests that it is the hope of the American Government that these zones will be acceptable to the likes of Russia and China because they will be controlled by supposedly nicer, non-jihadist opposition types, and not because they were won by force, and by nasty Islamists. Extrapolating what the reality is likely to look like from the known data if the US gets its way, what will probably be created are areas where America’s Islamist allies – and the relationship between the two should never be forgotten just because Hilary Clinton has a new scheme of spin – will operate from under the skirts of the UN and continue the same campaign of terror that has already been instigated. The objective will be to alienate the Syrian Government from the Syrian people by impressing upon the latter that the former is ineffective against terrorists. Meanwhile, there will be no terror in the “administrative” zones, which will provide a model of order and safety that the Syrian people will come to think that al-Assad will never be able to supply.
At least as far as the UK is concerned, there are indications that instructions have been delivered to key operatives regarding what narrative to establish in order to shape the perception of the watching public in anticipation of the US Government’s new strategy; David Cameron is now accepting that President al-Assad might be excused any and all of the alleged war crimes leveled at him, and the Daily Mail is writing remarkable sentances such as the following:
he was buried under rubble, another civilian victim of the bitter internal fighting between President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and the militant Islamist groups.
The power behind the US Government, no matter who wins today’s election, is determined to put a puppet government into power in Syria. It has spent a long time these last two years failing, not once, but probably twice or even thrice already, and, because no matter how bad the al-Assad government is (and it isn’t all that bad because of the political reforms that have been instituted already), it’s a great deal better than a bankster-overlorded failed state awash with terrorist factions, the very good news for Syrians is this: because the US-shaped “Syrian” “opposition” cannot agree between itself, the global elite Bilderberg-types might fail yet again.